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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-
2a-3(2)G) of the Utah Code. 
ISSUES OF REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court correct when it granted the defendant's motion for j.n.o.v. 
and ruled that there was no competent evidence to support the jury's finding that the defendant 
was negligent when he began to fall while skiing, and that defendant's negligence was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it conditionally granted defendant's 
motion for a new trial when the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff was against the great 
weight of the evidence? 
3. Did the trial court err when it excluded the defendant's expert testimony 
concerning the application and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code to the facts of 
this case? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. On an appeal for the grant of a motion for j.n.o.v. the proper standard of 
review is the same standard as used by the trial court. Gold Standard. Inc. v. Getty Oil Co.. 
915 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Utah 1996). In passing on a motion for a j.n.o.v. a trial court has no 
latitude and must be correct. Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp.. 921 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 
1996)(quotations omitted). Furthermore, "the trial court is justified in granting a j.n.o.v. only 
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if, after looking at the evidence and all of its reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party, the trial court concludes that there is no competent evidence to support a 
verdict in the nonmoving party's favor." id. Therefore, an appellate court "must review the 
record and determine whether there is any basis in the evidence, including reasonable 
inferences which could be drawn therefrom, to support the jury's determination. . . ." Jd. 
2. "A ruling on a motion for a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal except 
when there is a clear or manifest abuse of discretion." Braithwaite. 921 P.2d at 1001 (quoting 
Amoss v. Bennion. 517 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Utah 1973)). An appellate court presumes that the 
discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the 
contrary. Goddard v. Hickman. 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984). When a trial court grants 
a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court will sustain a trial court's 
ruling when there is "substantial competent evidence which would support a verdict for the 
moving party." Braithwaite. 921 P.2d at 1001. 
3. On an appeal of the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony, an appellate 
court reviews whether the trial court abused its discretion. Steffensen v. Smith's Management 
Corp.. 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993). The burden is on the complaining party to prove 
that there is a "reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different if the trial court 
had allowed the expert testimony." Id. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES OR RULES 
Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for j.n.o.v. Rule 
59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for new trials. The text of those 
rules is set out in Appellant's addendum. Provisions from the Skier's Responsibility Code that 
are relevant to this case are set forth in the addendum of this brief. Utah's "Inherent Risk of 
Skiing" statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51 et. seq. (1997), is also included in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Court Below 
This case is an action to recover for personal injuries the plaintiff, Gary Ricci 
("Ricci"), sustained because of ski a accident at Snowbird Ski Resort in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. Ricci alleged that the defendant, Charles Shoultz1 ("Shoultz") was negligent when 
Shoultz, who was 20 feet in front and 10 feet to the left of Ricci, lost control of his skis and 
fell into Ricci's path as the two skiers were skiing on a run called "Anderson Hill." (R. 586-
87, 605). 
The case was tried to a jury on March 11, 12, and 13, 1996. (R. 150-51, 209). 
Prior to trial, the trial court excluded expert testimony by Snowbird employees regarding the 
cause of the accident and the application and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code. 
(R. 442). The court only allowed testimony that the code was posted and published by 
1
 The pleadings in this case misspell Appellee's name. This brief will use the 
proper spelling. 
3 
Snowbird Ski Resort and an instruction was given to the jury concerning the code. (R. 442, 
793). 
The case then proceeded to trial before the jury. After the parties rested, Shoultz 
properly moved for a directed verdict. (R. 838-39). The trial court denied the motion and 
allowed the case to go to the jury. (R. 842). The jury returned a special verdict. It found 
that Shoultz was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs 
injuries. It found that Ricci was also negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate 
cause of his injuries. The jury awarded the plaintiff $16,458.84 for past medical expenses, 
$12,579.00 for past lost income and $100,000.00 for lost future income or loss of earning 
capacity, for a total award of $129,037.84. (R. 244-46). A judgment was entered in favor of 
Ricci and against Shoultz for $134,769.04, which included $5,731.20 in prejudgment interest. 
(R. 270-72). 
Shoultz filed a motion for j.n.o.v., or alternatively for a new trial or for remittitur, 
on the grounds that (1) the jury's finding that Shoultz was negligent was contrary to the 
evidence and against the law; (2) the jury's finding that Ricci's negligence was not a proximate 
cause of his injuries was contrary to the evidence and against the law; (3) the trial court erred 
in excluding expert testimony regarding the skier's responsibility code; and (4) the award of 
$12,579.00 for past lost wages was against the law because it was based on lost gross income, 
not net income. (R. 273-87). 
4 
At the hearing on Shoultz's motion, the trial court rejected Shoultz's arguments 
based on the exclusion of expert testimony and the alleged inconsistency in the jury's finding 
that the plaintiff was negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of his 
injuries. (R. 340-42). With respect to the exclusion of Shoultz's expert testimony, the court 
stated: 
I know that the experts, to my knowledge, they came in, and the first 
knowledge that was given to [plaintiffs counsel] that they were going to 
testify as experts. And [plaintiffs counsel] had not been given any notice 
of the same. 
The court felt he was entitled to have notice of expert witnesses, and 
entitled to find his own experts if he chose to do so, which he didn't have 
time. 
(R. 341). 
The trail court, however, granted Shoultz's motion for j.n.o.v. With respect to 
that ruling, the court stated: 
And the only time this court is going to disturb a jury verdict is where I 
feel I have a duty and a responsibility so to do, in a case where the jury 
completely missed the situation. And, as I say, that's something this 
court does not like to do, unless the court feels like its's such a case that 
I would be derelict in my duty if I did not do so. 
And, in this case, I feel that. I felt, at the time the jury brought the 
verdict back, that they were dead wrong. I felt, during the course of the 
trial, that there was no cause of action. 
I've read your memorandums, and I'm still of the same opinion — even 
persuaded more — that there was no duty owed to the plaintiff. And — 
maybe I should correct that: there was a duty not to be negligent. But 
there was no negligence on the part of the defendant in this case, and 
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negligence, if any, was on the part of [Ricci] and his failure to ski under 
control in consistency with the skier's code. 
(R. 342). 
Shoultz submitted a proposed order granting his motion for a j.n.o.v. and 
conditionally granting his motion for a new trial, and Ricci objected to the proposed order. 
(R. 346-47, 350-51, 363-69). Following a hearing on the plaintiffs objections, the court 
signed Shoultz's proposed order but struck the paragraph conditionally granting a new trial. 
(R. 379, 383-85). The court later called counsel and indicated that it was amending its prior 
ruling to conditionally grant Shoultz's motion for a new trial. (R. 396-97). Following another 
hearing, the court denied Ricci's objection to the proposed modification and entered an 
amended order nunc pro tunc conditionally granting Shoultz's motion for a new trial. (R. 399-
401). 
Ricci has appealed the trial court's order granting Shoultz a j.n.o.v. and 
conditionally granting Shoultz's motion for a new trial. (R. 392). Shoultz has filed a cross-
appeal on the basis that should the appellate court reverse on the ruling of j.n.o.v. and 
consider the new trial grant, the trial court erred when it refused to allow Shoultz to call 
expert witnesses regarding the applicability and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility 
Code. (R. 404). 
B. Statement of Facts 
The appellant, Gary Ricci ("Ricci"), is a self-described "highly advanced expert 
skier" and has been skiing for seventeen years. (R. 550, 553). The appellee, Charles Shoultz 
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("Shoultz"), is an "advanced/intermediate" skier and has skied for approximately seven years. 
(R. 796, 815). On April 12, 1994, Ricci and Shoultz were involved in a ski accident at 
Snowbird Ski Resort on a run known as "Anderson's Hill." (R. 556). 
Anderson Hill is considered quite steep. At the bottom, however, it flattens out 
into a "runout." (R. 569). There is a slight rise near the end of the runout. (R. 581-582). As 
skiers reach the runout, they customarily straighten out their path to maintain their speed so as 
to make it over that flat portion. (R. 580-81). On the day of the accident, the snow conditions 
were "basic spring morning." This means that the snow had melted during the day and froze 
during the night. Therefore, the snow was hard and smooth on the catted2 or groomed 
surface. (R. 565, 663). 
Ricci, upon approaching the top of Anderson Hill, saw a group of skiers skiing in 
the middle and catted portion of the bowl approximately 100 feet in front of him. (R. 570). 
This group was a ski class of which Shoultz was a member. (R. 822). The skiers, at the 
request of the instructor, Karl Boyer ("Boyer"), were making small turns in the catted portion 
of the bowl as they were descending. (R.571, 828). Ricci began to descend the hill on the left 
side of the catted portion. (R. 571). As Ricci approached the middle of the hill, he was 
approximately 75 feet behind the ski class and 10-15 feet to their left. (R. 666-67). Upon 
reaching the bottom of the hill which flattens out into a runout, Ricci was 20 feet behind and 
10 feet to the left of Shoultz. (R. 587). Both skiers were traveling at approximately 20 miles-
2
 A ski run is "catted" by a tractor-type machine that rolls over the snow and 
smooths out the terrain, making it easier to ski. (R. 565). 
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per-hour and were on a straight path. (R. 586-87). Ricci had no reason to believe that 
Shoultz knew Ricci was coming up behind him and did not observe anything about the way 
Shoultz was skiing that caused him any concern prior to the accident. (R. 588, 672). 
Likewise, Shoultz did not know that Ricci was behind and to the left of him. (R. 809). 
Ricci stated that just as the runout begins to rise, he saw Shoultz having difficulty 
with his skis. (R. 589). He claimed that Shoultz's skis "split at the tip" and then Shoultz 
"caught an edge" on the snow. (R. 589). In other words, Shoultz's skis were no longer 
planing on the surface of the snow. The left ski rolled over on an edge which caused Shoultz 
to veer to his left and begin to fall. (R. 590, 668-69). As Shoultz was falling to his left, he 
lost speed and the two skiers collided with Shoultz veering into Ricci's right hip and leg. (R 
591). Ricci, too, swerved to his left in an attempt to avoid a collision. However, his efforts 
were unsuccessful and the two skiers were forced into the trees off the edge of the trail. (R. 
593, 669-70). In sum, Ricci claimed that two seconds prior to the collision, Shoultz was in 
control; and one second prior, he "caught an edge" and was not in control. (R. 589, 605). 
At trial, Shoultz gave a different version of the accident. Shoultz testified that he 
was skiing straight in the runout and approaching his ski instructor and another ski-class 
member at an approximate speed of 5 m.p.h. (R. 810). Shoultz was halfway through the 
runout when, without warning, he was hit from behind and knocked toward his left and off the 
trail. (R. 806). Therefore, Ricci struck Shoultz from behind on the backside of his right 
thigh. (R. 807). That collision caused Shoultz to veer off the trail and into a tree. Shoultz hit 
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the tree with his shoulders. (R. 811). Shoultz testified that just prior to the collision, he did 
not begin to fall and did not catch an edge. (R. 810). 
Evidence was introduced of the Skier's Responsibility Code. That code is a well 
publicized list of rules that is put together by the National Ski Area Association. Nearly all ski 
resorts in the United States use it as a sort of "rules of the road." (R. 331). Snowbird 
publishes the code on its "Skier's Guide" and also posts it at the base of the ski lifts and some 
ticket sales locations. (R. 794). In part, the code provides: 
(1) Ski under control and in such a manner that you can stop or avoid 
other skiers or objects. 
(2) When skiing downhill or overtaking another skier, you must avoid the 
skier below you. 
(R. 602, 606). In order for Ricci to obtain a Snowbird Season ski pass, he had to sign an 
agreement in which he stated that he understood the code and would abide by it. (R. 436). 
Prior to trial, the trial court excluded expert testimony by Snowbird employees, 
particularly Bob Bonar ("Bonar"), Snowbird's mountain operations manager, regarding the 
application and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code. (R. 442). The court only 
allowed Bonar to testify that the code was posted and published by Snowbird Ski Resort. (R. 
442, 793). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly granted Shoultz's motion for j.n.o.v. Even when the 
evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party (Ricci), Shoultz is entitled 
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to judgment as a matter of law. That evidence merely shows that Shoultz accidentally caught 
an edge on the snow and began to fall. When a person falls while skiing, he or she is not 
negligent as a matter of law. (Point I). 
If Shoultz is not entitled to j.n.o.v., then the trial court correctly granted Shoultz's 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Substantial 
evidence was produced at trial to support a verdict in his favor and against Ricci. The 
evidence showed that Shoultz was skiing straight through a runout at the bottom of a hill. He 
was skiing at a speed of 5 m.p.h., did not catch an edge and did not begin to fall. Instead, 
Ricci ran into Shoultz from behind on his right backside and forced him into the trees off the 
trail. Likewise, evidence produced at trial showed that Ricci was either the "uphill" skier or 
an "overtaking" skier, and violated the Skier's Responsibility Code when he failed to avoid 
Shoultz as the "downhill" skier. Thus, there was evidence that Ricci's actions were the 
proximate cause of his injuries which would support a verdict in Shoultz's favor. (Point II). 
If the trial court erred in granting Shoultz a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, then Shoultz is entitled to a new trial because the trial court 
abused its discretion when it excluded expert testimony concerning the application and 
interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Handbook. Ricci possessed notice that those 
witnesses would testify as experts, and proper foundation could have been laid for such 
testimony. Had the trial court allowed the experts to testify, there is a substantial likelihood 
that the verdict would have been different. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SHOULTZ'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT. 
A trial court properly grants a motion for a j.n.o.v. when the evidence is, as matter 
of law, insufficient to support the jury verdict. Gold Standard. Inc. v. Getty Oil Co.. 915 P.2d 
1060, 1066 (Utah 1996). Therefore, a trial court is justified in granting a j.n.o.v. if, after 
looking at the evidence and all its reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, there is no competent evidence to support a verdict in favor of that party. 
Id. In this case, Shoultz was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Even when all the 
evidence presented at trial is considered in the light most favorable to Ricci, there was simply 
no competent evidence to support a finding that Shoultz was negligent. Simply put, the 
evidence merely showed that Shoultz fell while skiing, which is a regular, normal and 
anticipated part of the sport. 
A. UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, SHOULTZ WAS NOT 
NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IF HE FELL WHILE 
SKIING. 
In order to establish a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must establish that (1) 
defendant owed plaintiff a duty; (2) defendant breached the duty; (3) the breach of the duty was 
the proximate cause of plaintiff s injuries; and (4) damages. See Cannon v. University of 
Utah. 866 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1993). The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a 
question of law to be determined by the court. CT v. Martinez. 845 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 1992). 
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A plaintiff cannot recover in the absence of a showing of a duty. Rollins v. Peterson. 813 P.2d 
1156, 1158 (Utah 1991). 
In this case, Shoultz had a duty to ski in a reasonable manner as determined by the 
totality of the circumstances. (See Jury Instruction No. 14 at R. 224). Ricci was held to that 
same duty. At trial, Ricci testified that two seconds before the accident, Shoultz was in 
control; one second prior to the accident, Shoultz "caught an edge" on the snow, lost control 
and began to fall. (R. 589, 605). There was no evidence that Shoultz engaged in careless, 
reckless or out-of-control skiing. Ricci testified at trial that Shoultz and his other class 
members were not having any difficulty as they skied down the middle of Anderson Hill and 
that all members were in control as they did so. (R. 572). Karl Boyer, Shoultz's ski 
instructor, testified that throughout the day, Shoultz never exhibited any unsafe conduct while 
skiing. (R. 822). Simply put, there is no evidence, even when it is viewed in a light most 
favorable to Ricci, that shows Shoultz was engaging in any sort of activity that increased the 
risk of him falling. See Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991)(Snowbird 
employee jumped off of steep crest and landed on plaintiff's head; employee ignored sign 
instructing skiers to ski slowly at that point and disregarded Snowbird ski patrol instructions 
telling skiers not to jump off the crest); Freeman v. Hale. 30 Cal. App. 4h 1388 
(1994)(defendant did not have a duty to avoid an inadvertent collision with plaintiff while 
skiing but did have a duty to not increase that risk by consuming large quantities of alcohol 
while skiing). 
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The evidence presented in a light most favorable to Ricci shows the following. 
The accident at issue in this case occurred on the easiest part of the mountain. The runout at 
the bottom of Anderson Hill was "catted" or groomed snow. (R. 817, 827). The day was clear 
and the weather was good. There was nothing in Shoultz's path to obstruct him. (R. 564-65, 
604, 801, 829-30). Ricci testified that with his experience in skiing, if he was skiing on that 
flat area of the run, he would not have "caught an edge" and fell if he was paying attention to 
his skiing. (R. 678). Therefore, Ricci argues that there is competent evidence from which the 
jury could conclude that Shoultz was negligent when he began to fall and that such negligence 
was the proximate cause of Ricci's injuries. 
Ricci's argument, while appealing, misses the point. In this case, there is no 
evidence in the record that Shoultz was inattentive while he was skiing on the runout or on any 
other portion of the mountain. Instead, the evidence shows that the opposite is true. Stripped 
to its true form, Ricci's argument is that: Shoultz had a duty to not fall while skiing; because 
Shoultz fell while skiing, he must have been negligent. Ricci's argument ignores the fact that 
falling and inadvertent collisions with other skiers are an inherent part of the sport. Otherwise, 
every skier on the slopes would be guilty of negligence every time he or she accidentally fell. 
Clearly, a skier can be guilty of negligence if he or she skis recklessly or out of control and 
endangers other skiers. However, when a simple fall is alleged, such conduct does not, as a 
matter of law, constitute negligence. 
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For example, in Thompson v. McNeill. 559 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1990), the Supreme 
Court of Ohio was faced with an analogous situation. The plaintiff was hit in the forehead 
with a golf ball that had been struck by the defendant. The evidence established that defendant 
had shanked the shot toward the plaintiff and had yelled "fore" in order to warn the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff apparently did not hear such a warning and was struck. The court held that there 
was no liability for injuries caused by mere negligent conduct between participants of sporting 
events. The court stated: 
Acts that would give rise to tort liability for negligence on a city street or 
in a back yard are not negligent in the context of a game where such an 
act is foreseeable and within the rules. For instance, a golfer who hits 
practice balls in his back yard and inadvertently hits a neighbor who is 
gardening or mowing the lawn next door must be held to a different 
standard than a golfer whose drive hits another golfer on a golf course. 
The principal difference is the golfer's duty to the one he hit. The 
neighbor, unlike the other golfer or spectator on the course, has not 
agreed to participate or watch and cannot be expected to foresee or accept 
the attendant risk of injury. Conversely, the spectator or participant must 
accept from a participant conduct associated with that sport. Thus, a 
player who injures another player in the course of a sporting event by 
conduct that is a foreseeable, customary part of the sport cannot be held 
liable for negligence because no duty is owed to protect the victim from 
that conduct. Were we to find such a duty between co-participants in a 
sport, we might well stifle the rewards of athletic competition. 
Id. at 707; See also Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc.. 901 P.2d 1013 (Utah 1995)(being 
struck by a foul ball at a baseball game "is one of the natural risks assumed by spectators 
attending professional games;" and beyond providing protection against such behind home 
plate, stadium does not have a duty to protect spectators from foul balls careening into the 
stands). 
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In the ski collision case of Freeman v. Hale. 30 Cal. App. 4th 1388 (1994), the 
court reasoned similarly: 
As a general rule, persons have a duty to use due care to avoid injury to 
others, and may be held liable if their careless conduct injures another 
person . . . . In the sports setting, however, conditions or conduct that 
otherwise might be viewed as dangerous often are an integral part of the 
sport itself. Although defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate 
(or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself, it is well 
established that defendants generally do have a duty to use due care not to 
increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the 
sport. 
Id. at 1393 (quoting Knight v. Jewett. 3 Cal. 4th 296, 315-16 (1992)). Thus, the court 
concluded that conduct is outside the range of ordinary activity involved in a sport "if the 
prohibition of that conduct would neither deter vigorous participation in the sport nor 
otherwise fundamentally alter the nature of the sport." Id. at 1394. 
In the instant case, it is foreseeable to all skiers that other skiers on the slope may 
fall. In fact, it is the rare individual who never falls while skiing. See McDaniel v. Powell. 
26 Cal. Rptr. 140 (Cal. App. 1962)(evidence at trial showing that "even expert skiers 'can go 
out of control,' and that when skiers do so they may fall or they may ski out of control for a 
distance before they fall; anyone who happens to be in the pathway of such may be hit"). 
Indeed, the Utah Legislature has enacted an "Inherent risk of skiing" statute. .See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-51 et. seq. (1997). The statute bars claims against a ski operator for injury 
resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing. Although in this case Ricci has made no 
claim against the ski operator, the statute is significant in that the legislature specifically deems 
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"collisions with other skiers" as an inherent risk of skiing. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-52(1) 
(1997)("Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part 
of the sport of skiing, including, but not limited to . . . collisions with other skiers."). 
Falling while skiing is foreseeable. A person cannot be held liable for falling 
because no duty is owed to protect other skiers from that conduct. When a person accidentally 
catches his or her ski edge on the snow, an inherent risk of the sport is that that person may 
begin to fall into another skier. Such is what occurred in this case. A skier does owe another 
a duty to ski reasonably under the totality of the circumstances. However, there was no 
evidence put forth at trial that Shoultz did not do so. Instead, the evidence merely 
demonstrates that Shoultz accidently caught an edge which caused him to veer to his left and 
begin to fall into Ricci's path. In summary, the following statement by the Utah Supreme 
Court rings loud and true when applied to the facts of this case: 
Not every accident that occurs gives rise to a cause of action upon which 
the party injured may recover damages from someone. Thousands of 
accidents occur every day for which no one is liable in damages, and often 
no one is to blame, . . . . 
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476, 479 (Utah 1996)(quoting Martin v. Safeway 
Stores. Inc.. 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977)). The trial court correctly granted Shoultz's 
motion for j.n.o.v. when it found that Shoultz was not negligent as a matter of law. 
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II. EVEN IF SHOULTZ IS NOT ENTITLED TO J.N.O.V., HE IS 
ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE EXISTS WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A 
VERDICT IN HIS FAVOR. 
The decision of the trial court to grant a new trial on the basis of insufficient 
evidence, Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6), will not be disturbed on appeal when the record contains 
substantial competent evidence which would support a verdict in favor of the party moving for 
a new trial. Braithwaite v. West Valley Citv. Corp.. 921 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1996). The 
substantial evidence standard requires that evidence be "sufficient in amount and credibility 
that, when considered in connection with the other evidence and circumstances shown in the 
case, would justify some, but not necessarily all, reasonable minds acting fairly thereon to 
believe it to be the truth." Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins. Brown & Gunnell. 713 P.2d 
55, 58 (Utah 1986).3 Although an appellate court determines that there was sufficient evidence 
supporting a jury's verdict in favor of the nonmoving party, that does not preclude a finding 
that substantial competent evidence exists for a verdict in favor of the moving party. 
3
 In Price-Orem. the Utah Supreme Court also stated: 
To establish that the trial court erroneously granted a new trial . . . [the 
nonmoving party] must marshal the evidence supporting [the moving 
party's] case and demonstrate that such evidence is not sufficiently 
substantial or credible to support a verdict in favor of [the moving 
party]. 
Price-Orem Investment Co. 713 P.2d at 58. Ricci's brief fails to meet that requirement. 
Nevertheless, this section of Shoultz's brief will set forth the evidence which would support a 
verdict in his favor. 
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Braithwaite. 921 P.2d at 1002. In this case, because substantial competent evidence exists for 
a verdict in favor of Shoultz, this court should affirm the trial court's grant of a new trial. 
A. SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT 
SHOULTZ WAS NOT NEGLIGENT. 
As argued previously with respect to Shoultz's argument that he was entitled to 
j.n.o.v., there is simply no competent evidence upon which a jury could base a finding that 
Shoultz was negligent. The evidence submitted by Ricci at trial merely showed that Shoultz 
fell while skiing. There was no evidence submitted that Shoultz was out of control or in any 
other way engaging in reckless or careless skiing. Instead, Ricci's testimony showed that 
Shoultz accidently caught the edge of his ski on the snow. That caused his skis to split at the 
tip and Shoultz veered to his left and began to fall. The two skiers, then, collided. (R. 590-
91, 668-69). The mere fact of falling while skiing does not constitute negligence. See supra 
Point I. 
In turn, Shoultz testified that he never caught the edge of his ski and he was not 
falling when the collision occurred. (R. 810). Instead, Shoultz was halfway through the 
runout when, without warning, Ricci hit him from behind on the back right side which forced 
him into the trees. (R. 806-07). Shoultz hit the trees with his shoulders, his skis were under 
him and when he hit the tree, the skis bent and "pitched" him backwards into the snow. (R. 
811). At trial, Shoultz produced photographs of severe bruising on his right back side which 
tended to confirm his testimony. Shoultz's medical records showed that he also sustained 
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bruising on his left side, particularly his left front shoulder and left front thigh. Again, Shoultz 
testified he hit the trees going forward with the primary force on his shoulders which would 
explain the bruising on his left side. Shoultz did not take a picture of that bruising because by 
the time he had photographs taken ten days after the accident, such bruising was gone. (R. 
694). In other words, the impact to his right buttocks had been more severe than that to his 
left shoulder and thigh and Shoultz's desire was to document the cause of the collision and not 
the minor injuries to his left side which resulted from his tumble into the trees. That evidence 
too, substantiates Shoultz's version of how the collision occurred. 
Finally, the evidence concerning the Skier's Responsibility Code provides 
substantial competent evidence which would support a verdict in Shoultz's favor. The code is 
a well publicized list of rules that is put together by the National Ski Area Association. Nearly 
all ski resorts in the United States use it as a sort of "rules of the road." (R. 331): See Ninio v. 
ffight, 385 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1967)(plaintiff, the downhill skier, was injured when defendant 
ran into her; jury entered verdict in favor of defendant finding no negligence; appellate court 
remanded for new trial because trial court failed to instruct jury concerning rule that uphill 
skier must yield to skiers below). Snowbird publishes the code on its "Skier's Guide" and also 
posts it at the base of the ski lifts and some ticket sales locations. (R. 794). In order for Ricci 
to obtain a Snowbird Season Ski Pass, he had to sign an agreement in which he stated that he 
understood the code and would abide by it. (R. 436). The code provides in pertinent part: 
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SKIER'S RESPONSIBILITY CODE 
There are elements of risk in skiing that common sense and personal 
awareness can help reduce. 
1. Ski in control or in such a manner that you can stop or avoid other 
skiers or objects. 
2. When skiing downhill or overtaking another skier, you must avoid 
the skier below you . 
(R. 602, 606; Attached herein as Addendum). Evidence at trial showed that Ricci failed to 
adhere to the above provisions.4 
As Ricci was descending Anderson Hill, he was behind Shoultz. Likewise, when 
the collision occurred on the runout, he was behind Shoultz. Ricci testified that just prior to 
the collision, he was 20 feet behind and 10 feet to the left of Shoultz. (R. 570, 587, 666-67). 
Shoultz, therefore, was the "downhill" skier throughout the series of events and Ricci was the 
4
 Violation of a code, ordinance or statute, although not constituting negligence per 
se, may be used as evidence of negligence. Gaw v. State. 798 P.2d 1130, 1135 (Utah App. 
1990); Intermountain Farmers Assoc, v. Fitzgerald. 574 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1978). cert denied. 
439 U.S. 860 (1978). Other jurisdictions have also recognized this general rule. See Rolick v, 
Collins Pine Co.. 975 F.2d 1009, 1012-14 (3rd Cir. 1992), cert denied. 507 U.S. 973 
(1993)(Expert witness allowed to testify concerning his opinion that defendant had failed to 
cause a logging operation to be conducted in accordance with industry standards incorporated 
in a regulation of OSHA; such testimony used as evidence of negligence); Martin v. Mapco 
Ammonia Pipeline. Inc.. 866 F. Supp. 1304, 1306 (D.Kan. 1994)(Evidence of compliance or 
noncompliance with Pipeline Safety Act and OSHA is admissible in negligence action to show 
applicable standard of care and defendant's conformity with that standard); Nehring v. 
Lacounte. 712 P.2d 1329, 133-34 (Mont. 1986)(the violation of a statute, although not 
negligence per se, nevertheless may be relevant in determining whether a defendant's conduct 
was negligent by fixing a standard against which negligence can be measured). 
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"uphill" skier. According to the code, Ricci had a duty to avoid Shoultz as the downhill skier.5 
Ricci's only explanation for why he could not stop or avoid Shoultz was that he "didn't have 
time." (R. 592-594). The only plausible explanation of why the two skiers collided, then, was 
that Ricci was skiing too close to Shoultz. In other words, Ricci failed to ski sufficiently far 
behind and/or to the side of Shoultz to be able to avoid Shoultz in the event Shoultz turned, 
stopped or fell. The fact that Ricci was unable to stop or avoid Shoultz is competent evidence 
that Ricci's failure was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus, would support a verdict 
in Shoultz's favor. 
Likewise, evidence adduced at trial showed that Ricci was overtaking Shoultz at the 
time of the accident.6 At the top of Anderson Hill, Ricci saw Shoultz and the rest of his ski 
class skiing in the middle of the catted portion of the bowl approximately 100 feet in front of 
him. (R. 570). Ricci began to descend the hill on the left side of the catted portion. (R. 571.) 
As Ricci approached the middle of the hill, he was approximately 75 feet behind Shoultz and 
10-15 feet to his left. (R. 666-67). Upon reaching the bottom of the hill which flattens out 
into the runout, Ricci was 20 feet behind and 10 feet to the left of Shoultz. (R. 587). Thus, 
5
 In his brief, Ricci makes the surprising argument that because the runout rises 
slightly, Ricci was not skiing downhill. Thus, he could not be the "uphill" skier and the code 
provision regarding the duty of the "uphill" skier does not apply to him. Common sense 
dictates that his interpretation completely strains the meaning of the safety code. 
6
 At trial, Ricci testified that he was not overtaking Shoultz. (R. 606). However, 
simply because there is competing testimony on this (or any other point) does not preclude a 
finding that Shoultz presented substantial competent evidence supporting his position. 
Braithwaite. 921 P.2d at 1002. 
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Ricci had made up a distance of 80 feet as the skiers were descending Anderson Hill. In turn, 
Shoultz testified that he was proceeding at approximately 5 m.p.h. and was skiing in a straight 
course through the runout. Ricci testified that he was approaching Shoultz at a speed of 20 
m.p.h. on the runout. The difference between the skiers' speed, then, was 15 m.p.h. and 
Ricci, as the uphill skier was overtaking Shoultz not only on the steeper part of the hill, but on 
the runout. In such a case, Ricci had a duty to avoid Shoultz and evidence at trail concerning 
his failure to do so would support a verdict in favor of Shoultz. 
In this case, Shoultz was not, as a matter of law, negligent. Under Ricci's theory 
of the case, Shoultz merely began to fall when his ski caught an edge on the snow. Falling 
while skiing is not negligent. Likewise, other substantial competent evidence was adduced at 
trial which would support a verdict in Shoultz's favor. The evidence showed that Shoultz did 
not catch and edge or begin to fall. Instead, Ricci ran into Shoultz from behind and on 
Shoultz's right back side. Finally, substantial competent evidence was given at trial that Ricci 
was both the "uphill" skier and the "overtaking" skier. As such, that skier "must avoid the 
downhill skier below. . . . " A finding that Ricci was either the "uphill" or "overtaking" skier 
would support a verdict in Shoultz's favor, because Ricci's actions would be the proximate 
cause of the collision. If Shoultz is not entitled to j.n.o.v., then the trial court correctly 
granted his motion for a new trial pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 59(6) (1997). 
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III. IF SHOULTZ IS NOT ENTITLED TO J.N.O.V. OR A NEW 
TRIAL PURSUANT TO UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(6), HE IS ENTITLED 
TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN IT EXCLUDED EXPERT TESTIMONY 
CONCERNING THE SKIER'S RESPONSIBILITY CODE. 
On an appeal of the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony, an appellate court 
reviews whether the trial court abused its discretion. Steffensen v. Smith's Management 
Corp.. 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993). The burden is on the complaining party to prove 
that there is a "reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different if the trial court 
had allowed the expert testimony." Id. Because the trial court abused its discretion in this 
manner and there is a reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different had the 
trial court allowed the expert testimony, Shoultz is entitled to a new trail. 
Prior to trail, the court excluded expert testimony by Snowbird employees, 
particularly, Bob Bonar, Snowbird's mountain operations manager, regarding the application 
and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code to the facts of this case. (R. 442). The 
court only allowed Bonar to testify that the code was posted and published by Snowbird Ski 
Resort. (R. 442, 793).7 
The court did not allow Shoultz's experts to testify concerning the interpretation of 
the code because Shoultz's counsel did not designate those witnesses as experts and the court 
felt that Ricci was entitled to notice concerning expert witnesses. (R. 341). However, the trial 
7
 A jury instruction was given concerning the Skier's Responsibility Code. .See 
Instruction No. 22 at R. 232). However, the jury was not permitted to hear testimony 
regarding the application of the code to the facts of the accident. 
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court's scheduling order did not impose a deadline for the designation of expert witnesses. In 
addition, the Snowbird employees, including Bonar, were asked question in their depositions 
as to whether they had formulated any opinions as to the cause of the accident and whether the 
respective parties had violated the Skier's Responsibility Code. (R. 331-32). Ricci had ample 
warning that such opinions would be elicited from these individuals and could have, if he chose 
to do so, investigated the possibility of retaining an expert to testify on his behalf concerning 
the application of the Skier's Responsibility Code. 
In addition, the trial court excluded the expert testimony on the basis that Shoultz 
could not lay appropriate foundation to allow Bonar to testify as to the application and/or 
interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code. (R. 442). Under Rule 702 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, such testimony would be permissible. An expert witness is allowed to 
testify if his testimony would assist the trier of fact in understanding a particular issue. Bonar 
was employed at Snowbird as the mountain manager. Prior to that, he was employed as the ski 
patrol director and assistant mountain manager. (R. 789-90). As such, Bonar was extremely 
well qualified in respect to the enforcement and implementation of the Skier's Responsibility 
Code at Snowbird. Therefore, a proper foundation could have been laid to allow Bonar to 
testify as to the application of the code in the particular context of this accident. Bonar would 
have been able to testify that the uphill skier (Ricci) had a duty to avoid the downhill skier 
(Shoultz), and that the uphill skier's failure to do so caused the accident. 
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Again, Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows experts to testify if their 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. 
Bonar's experience and specialized knowledge concerning the application, interpretation and 
enforcement of the Skier's Responsibility Code would have been a great assistance to the jury 
in applying the code to the particular facts at issue in this case. 
The fact that Bonar did not witness the accident is not dispositive. Bonar could 
have offered testimony as to the application, interpretation and enforcement of the code based 
upon the respective version of events presented by both Ricci and Shoultz. Bonar would not 
have been asked to render an opinion as to whether Ricci was negligent. See Randle v. Allen. 
862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1992); Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1991), .eert 
denied. 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). Instead, Bonar would have been asked to express an 
opinion, based upon each party's version of the accident, whether the respective parties had 
violated the Skier's Responsibility Code. An expert is entitled to testify as to whether a 
particular party was in compliance with a particular code provision without opining as to 
whether that individual was negligent. See cases cited supra n. 3. 
Had the trial court allowed Bonar to testify concerning the application and 
interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code, there is a likelihood that the jury verdict 
would have been different. Apparently, the jury was confused as to the code's interpretation. 
At trial, Ricci testified that the cause of the accident was that Shoultz lost control of his skis. 
However, when a person falls while skiing, he or she naturally "loses control." .See McDaniel 
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v. Powell. 26 Cal. Rptr. 140 (Cal. App. 1962). That is not the same, as the Skier's 
Responsibility Code provides, as a failure to "ski in control or in such a manner that you can 
stop or avoid other skiers or objects." In other words, a skier does have a responsibility to ski 
under control. A skier is not skiing "under control" if he or she is skiing excessively fast, 
recklessly or carelessly. However, a skier can fall or "lose control" when not engaging in that 
particular type of conduct. When a skier merely falls he or she is neither violating the Skier's 
Responsibility Code nor negligent in doing so. 
Had Bonar been able to clarify the above interpretation of the Skier's 
Responsibility Code to the trier of fact, there remains a likelihood that the verdict would have 
been different. If this Court determines that Shoultz was not entitled to j.n.o.v. or a new trial, 
then Shoultz is entitled to a new trial because the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing 
expert testimony concerning the application and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility 
Code. Ricci possessed notice of the expert testimony and proper foundation was available to 
allow the experts, particularly Bonar, to testify concerning the application and interpretation of 
the code to the facts of this case. That testimony was admissible pursuant to Rule 702 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was correct when it granted Shoultz's motion for j.n.o.v. Shoultz 
respectfully requests that this court affirm that ruling. If Shoultz is not entitled to j.n.o.v., 
then this court should affirm the trial court's ruling concerning the grant of a new trial. 
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Substantial competent evidence was produced at trial which would sustain a verdict in his 
favor. If Shoultz is not entitled to a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, then, because the trial court abused its discretion concerning the exclusion of expert 
testimony on the application and interpretation of the Skier's Responsibility Code, Shoultz is 
entitled to a new trial. A substantial likelihood exists that had the trial court allowed that 
testimony, the jury's verdict would have been different. 
DATED this j ^ d a y of December, 1997. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By hrrm it* hJJ/Sa^ 
Paul M. Belnap 
Robert L. Janicki 
Darren K. Nelson 
Attorneys for Appellee & Cross-Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
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Before using lifts or siding, yoU should 
review this safety information and study 
mountain and weather conditions. 
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Chairlift and Trum Sflfcly 
Before loading, please make 
sure you know and understand 
the loading and urdonding 
instructions as p o * 1 ^ •* •"« »'fi 
I f you need further instructions 
or special assistant* notify the 
operator prior to r n , e " n 8 ! n e 
loading area. 
When loading o" the chair-
lifts, small children tbould be 
loa<lcd on the o|XM««or'« «"Je of 
ihe chair. 
Please have tickets visible 
when entering all M * ' r " r c v c , y 
ride throughout the day. 
This will help speed up the 
operation. 
All of Snowbird's chairlifts 
arc double chairlifts. 'Ilicre are 
no "singles" lines. Please try to 
pair up when entering the line. 
W h e n loading the Tram, 
please proceed directly onto the 
T r a m Car, filling the corners 
first. This will help us begin the 
trip to the top as soon as fnnttihlc. 
I f you arc unfamiliar with nny 
of our lifts or have any ques-
tion*, please ask our n|K'rattMh 
for assistance. 
Vertical 
Rise Lifts 
Aerial T ramway ?• iP® " • J
 883.9 m. 
T rave l 
T i m e 
Peruvian 
Wilberc 
Cm I I 
Cad 2 
H I « * I JLJ*- IM * w - U..M.M 
AAid-Cad 
Little Cloud 
Chickadee 
1,000 rt. 
304.H m. 
668 ft. 
207.7 m. 
1.827 ft. 
557.0 m. 
1.239 ft. 
377.6 m. 
1,315 ft. 
401.0 m. 
1.304 ft. 
398.0 m. 
142 rt. 
43.3 m. 
8 min. 
6 min. 
4.5 min. 
13 min. 
9 min. 
9 min. 
7 min. 
3 min. 
Total Lift Capaci ty 9000 skiers per hour 
T r a v e l 
Length 
8.395 ft. 
2558.8 m. 
2.944 ft. 
897.3 in. 
2,080 ft. 
634.0 m. 
6.751 ft. 
2057.7 m. 
4.059 It. 
1237.2 m. 
4,287 ft. 
1306.7 m. 
4.291 ft. 
1307.9 m. 
842 ft. 
256.6 m. 
Skiers 
per hour 
125 per 
cabin 
1.2(H) 
1.200 
1.200 
1.200 
1.100 
1.200 
900 
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78-27-51 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-27-51. Inherent risks of skiing — Public policy. 
The Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is practiced by a large number 
of residents of Utah and attracts a large number of nonresidents, significantly 
contributing to the economy of this state. It further finds that few insurance 
carriers are willing to provide liability insurance protection to ski area opera-
tors and that the premiums charged by those carriers have risen sharply in 
recent years due to confusion as to whether a skier assumes the risks inherent 
in the sport of skiing. It is the purpose of this act, therefore, to clarify the law 
in relation to skiing injuries and the risks inherent in that sport, to establish 
as a matter of law that certain risks are inherent in that sport, and to provide 
that, as a matter of public policy, no person engaged in that sport shall recover 
from a ski operator for injuries resulting from those inherent risks. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 1. Cross-References. — Hazards inherent in 
Meaning of <*this a c t " — The term "this mountaineering, skiing and hiking and haz-
actw in the last sentence means Laws 1979, ards of area served by passenger tramways as-
Chapter 166, which appears as §§ 78-27-51 to sumed by skier or sportsman, § 63-11-37. 
78-27-54. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah's Inherent C.J.S. — 86 CJ.S. Theaters & Shows § 39 et 
Risks of Skiing Act: Avalanche from Capitol seq. 
Hill, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 355. A.L.R. — Liability for injury or death from 
From Wright to Sunday and Beyond: Is the ski lift, ski tow, or similar device, 95 A.L.R.3d 
Law Keeping Up With the Skiers?, 1985 Utah 203. 
L. Rev. 885. Ski resort's liability for skier's injuries re-
Am. Ju r . 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Amusements suiting from condition of ski run or slope, 55 
and Exhibitions § 81 et seq. ^ ^ I ? ^ ^ . 
Key Numbers. — Theaters and Shows «» 6. 
78-27-52. Inherent risks of skiing — Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or conditions which 
are an integral part of the sport of skiing, including, but not limited to: 
changing weather conditions, variations or steepness in terrain; snow or 
ice conditions; surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest 
growth, rocks, stumps, impact with lift towers and other structures and 
their components; collisions with other skiers; and a skier's failure to ski 
within his own ability. 
(2) "Injury" means any personal iiyury or property damage or loss. 
(3) "Skier" means any person present in a ski area for the purpose of 
engaging in the sport of skiing. 
(4) "Ski area" means any area designated by a ski area operator to be 
used for skiing. 
(5) "Ski area operator" means those persons, and their agents, officers, 
employees or representatives, who operate a ski area. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 2. 
Meaning of "this act" — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to § 78-27-51. 
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27-53 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Inherent risk. 
The term "inherent risk of skiing," using the 
ordinary and accepted meaning of the term "in-
herent," refers to those risks that are essential 
characteristics of skiing — risks that are so 
integrally related to skiing that the sport can-
not be undertaken without confronting these 
risks. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 
1037 (Utah 1991). 
The determination of whether a risk is in-
herent is to be made on a case-by-case basis, 
using the entire statute, not solely the list pro-
vided in Subsection (1). Clover v. Snowbird Ski 
Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). 
78-27-53. Inherent risks of skiing — Bar against claim or 
recovery from operator for injury from risks in-
herent in sport. 
Notwithstanding anything in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43 to the 
contrary, no skier may make any claim against, or recover from, any ski area 
operator for injury resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 3; 1986, ch. 
199, § 8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Assumption of risk. 
Comparative fault. 
Comparative legislation. 
Duty to protect skiers. 
Negligence. 
—Design or maintenance or ski run. 
—Supervision of employees. 
Assumption of risk. 
This statute is meant to achieve the same 
results achieved under the doctrine of primary 
assumption of risk. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Re-
sort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). 
Comparative fault 
Exempting suits concerning injuries caused 
by an inherent risk of skiing from the compar-
ative fault statute is consistent with the asser-
tion that the ski area operators are not at fault 
in such situations — that is, ski area operators 
have no duty to protect a skier from inherent 
risks of skiing. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 
808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). 
Comparative legislation. 
The protections ski area operators possess 
under § 63-11-37 are not more expansive than 
the protections they possess under this statute. 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 
(Utah 1991). 
Duty to protect skiers. 
Beyond the general warning prescribed by 
§ 78-27-54 a ski area operator is under no duty 
to protect its patrons from the inherent risks of 
skiing. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 
1037 (Utah 1991). 
A ski area operator is under no duty to make 
all of its runs as safe as possible by eliminating 
the type of dangers that skiers wish to confront 
as an integral part of skiing, such as powder, 
moguls, and steep grades. Clover v. Snowbird 
Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). 
Negligence. 
—Design or maintenance or ski run. 
Evidence raised a genuine issue of material 
fact, precluding summary judgment, in regard 
to the allegedly negligent design and mainte-
nance of a ski run that was alleged to create a 
hazard to skiers. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Re-
sort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). 
—Supervision of employees. 
Evidence raised a genuine issue of material 
fact, precluding summary judgment, as to 
whether a ski area operator was negligent in 
not supervising its employees in regard to the 
practice of reckless skiing. Clover v. Snowbird 
Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). 
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78-27-54 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah's Inherent 
Risks of Skiing Act: Avalanche from Capitol 
Hill, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 355. 
78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boards listing 
inherent risks and limitations on liability. 
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent locations 
within each ski area which shall include a list of the inherent risks of skiing, 
and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined in this act. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 4. 
Meaning of ttthis act." — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to § 78-27-51. 
78-27-55. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 78-27-55 (L. 1979, ch. 
166, § 5), relating to notice requirements in 
case of injury arising from the inherent risks of 
skiing and the statute of limitations on such 
action, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 43, § 1. 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or de-
fense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except 
under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees 
under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, $ 1; 1988, ch. 92, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted the 
Subsection designation (1); deleted "where not 
otherwise provided by statute or agreement" 
following "civil actions" in Subsection (1); sub-
stituted "shall" for "may" following "the court" 
in Subsection (1); added "except under Subsec-
tion (2)" at the end of Subsection (1) and added 
Subsection (2). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Breach of covenant of good faith by insurer. 
Discretion of court 
Essential elements. 
Findings. 
Frivolous appeal. 
Hearing. 
State of mind. 
"Without merit" and "good faith." 
Cited. 
Breach of covenant of good faith by in-
surer. 
Proof of a breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing by an insurer does not 
show the bad faith necessary for an award un-
der this section. Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 4l4 (Utah 1989). 
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